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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Peacetime  government  spending  has  risen 
steadily  from  less  than  10  percent  of  GNP  in  the 
1920s  to about  30 percent  of GNP  today.’  The  larger 
role  of government  has generated  increasing  interest 
in the  macroeconomic  effects  of government  spend- 
ing.-This  paper  examines  the  effects  of government 
spending  in  a  simple  macromodel.  A  small-scale 
neoclassical  model  is used  for  analyzing  a classical 
problem  in the  literature,  namely,  the  effects  of tem- 
porary  and persistent  changes  in government  spend- 
ing under  a balanced  budget.  It  is found  that  under 
a simple  lump-sum  tax financing  scheme,  persistent 
changes  in government  spending  have  much  larger 
effects  .on  economic  aggregates  (such  as  consump- 
tion,  output,  labor,  and  investment)  than  do  tem- 
porary  changes.  This  result  replicates  the  findings 
of  recent  studies  by  King  (1989)  and  Aiyagari, 
Christiano,  and  Eichenbaum  (1990). 
The  second  purpose  of this paper  is to analyze  the 
effects  of  government  spending  under  different  tax 
financing  regimes.  For  simplicity  or technical  reasons, 
the  above  studies  assume  that  government  purchases 
are  financed  by  lump-sum  taxes.*  This  assumption 
severely  limits  the  applicability  of the  theory  because 
most  taxes  are  distortionary.  The  current  paper  ex- 
tends  the  existing  literature  to  the  important  case  of 
income  tax financing.  The  results  ‘stemming from  this 
extension  are  fundamentally  different  from  those  of 
lump-sum  tax  financing.  For  example,  an  increase 
in government  spending  that  is financed  by  a lump- 
sum  tax  under  a balanced  budget  will increase  labor 
effort  and  real  output  because  of the  dominating  in- 
come  effect.  Under  income  tax  financing,  however, 
both  labor  effort  and  output  decline  instead  of  rise 
in response  to  an increase  in government  spending. 
’  I  would  like  to  thank  Tim  Cook,  Michael  Dotsey,  Marvin 
Goodfriend,  Robert  Hetzel,  and  Tom  Humphrey  for  helpful 
comments.  All  errors  are  my  own. 
r For  a  statistical  review  of  government  spending,  see  Barro 
(1984). 
2 A notable  exception  is Baxter  and  King (1990)  who  considered 
the  case  of  a proportional  tax.  Barro  (1984)  also  discussed  the 
implications  of  income  tax  financing. 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  II 
describes  a  model  economy  that  will  be  used  for 
analyzing  the  effects  of government  spending.  Sec- 
tion  III analyzes  the  consumer’s  problem.  Section  IV 
then  calibrates  the  model  economy  and  considers  a 
specific  example.  The  effects  of temporary  and  per- 
sistent  changes  in government  spending,  under  both 
the  lump-sum  tax  and  the  income  tax  regime,  are 
discussed  in  Section  V.  Section  VI  concludes  the 
paper  and  points  out  possible  extensions  for  future 
studies. 
II. 
THE  ECONOMY 
The  hypothetical  economy  is  assumed  to  be 
populated  by  a large,number  of identical  and infinitely 
lived  consumers.  Since  consumers  are  all  alike  by 
assumption,  their  behavior  can  be  represented  in 
terms  of a single  representative  agent.  At each  date 
t,  the  representative  agent  values  services  from  con- 
sumption  of a single  commodity  ct and  leisure  It. It 
is  assumed  that  both  leisure  and  the  consumption 
goods  are  normal  in  the  sense  that  more  is always 
desired  to  less  and  that  the  utility  function  u(ct,lt) 
satisfies  the  usual  restrictions,  namely,  it  is strictly 
increasing,  concave,  and  twice  differentiable. 
The  consumer  derives  his income  from  three  dif- 
ferent  sources.  First,  at time  t the  consumer  provides 
labor  s,ervices  nt  (hours  of work)  to  the  market  and 
earns  wage  income  wtnt,  where  wt  is  the  market- 
determined  hourly  real  wage  rate  expressed  in con- 
sumption  units.  Labor  hours  are  constrained  by  the 
total  time  endowment,  which  is normalized  to  one. 
Thus,  It  +  nt  =  1. The  second  source  of  income 
derives  from  the  holding  of  a  single  asset  called 
capital.  At  the  beginning  of  each  period,  the  con- 
sumer  rents  to firms  the  amount  of capital  kt carried 
from  the  previous  period  and  collects  capital  income 
rtkt,  where  rt  is the  market-determined  rental  rate 
expressed  in  consumption  units.  In  each  period, 
the  government  imposes  a  uniform  tax  rate  rt  on 
wage  income  and  capital  income  so  that  the  net-of- 
tax  earned  income  for  the  consumer  is (1  -  -rt)(wtnt 
+  rtkt).3 The  final source  of income  is the  lump-sum 
3 For  simplicity,  wage  income  and’capital  income  are  assumed 
to  be  taxed  at  the  ‘same  rate.  This  assumption  may  not  repre- 
sent  the  actual tax scheme  in the  U.S.  where  capital income  (e.g., 
capital  gains)  is usually taxed  at a lower  rate  than  is wage  income. 
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the  budget  constraint  of the  government,  the  lump- 
sum  payment  may  be  negative,  in which  case  there 
is a lump-sum  tax  imposed  on  the  consumer.  The 
total  disposable  income  for  the  consumer  at  time  t 
is therefore  (1 -  7Jwtnt  +  (1 -  Tt)rtkt +  vt, which  will 
be  allocated  between  consumption  and  investment. 
In  short,  the  budget  constraint  for  the  consumer  at 
time  t  is: 
max  [yt  -  wtnt  -  r,kJ 
subject  to  yt  =  F(kt,nt). 
ct  +  it  =  (1 -  Tt)wtnt  +  (1 -Tt)rtkt  +  vt,  (1) 
where  it  =  kt + I-  (1 -  6)kt is gross  investment4  arid 
6 is  the  depreciation  rate  of  capital  (0  <  6  <  1). 
While  the  capital  stock  will always  be positive,  gross 
investment  is allowed  to  become  negative.  That  is, 
investment  is reversible  in  the  sense  that  the  con- 
sumer  may  acttially  eat  some  existing  capital  stock 
if he  decides  to  do  so.5 
Note  that  the  firm’s  problem  is much  simpler  than 
that  of consumers;  it does  not  involve  any  intertem- 
poral  trade-off  as in the  consumer’s  problem.  Since 
the  market  is assumed  to  be  competitive,  the  zero 
profit  condition  dictates  that  capital  and  labor  will 
be  employed  up  to  the  point  where  the  rental  rate 
rt and  the  wage  rate  wt equal  the  marginal  product 
of  capital  and’labor,  r&pectively.  That  is: 
The  consumer’s  problem  is to choose  a sequence 
of contingent  plans for consumptitin  and labor supply, 
taking  prices  as  given,  so  as  to  maximize  his  dis- 
counted  expected  lifetime utility subject  to the budget 
constraint.  .Formally,  the  consumer  solves  the  follow- 
ing  maximization  problem: 
wt =  F&t,nt)  and rt  =  F&m)  (2) 
where  F,  and  Fk  are  the  marginal  product  of labor 
and  capital,  respectively.6  To  focus  on  government 
fiscal  shocks,  it has  been  assumed  that  there  is no 
uncertainty  in the  firm’s production  process.  Incor- 
porating  such  uncertainty  into  the  model  is easy,  but 
unnecessary.  Also,  for simplicity,  it is assumed  that 
the  firm’s  income  or  profit  is  not  taxed.’ 
mar%[t~081u(r,,lt~‘,0  <  P  <  1, 
subject  to  ct  +  it  =  (l.-~t)(w*nt  +  rtkt)  +  vt, 
and 
It  +  nt  =  1,  for  all t, 
where  fl is the  time  preference  discounting  factor  and 
Eo is  the  conditional  expectation  operator.  Expec- 
tations  are  taken  conditional  on  the  future  course 
of  government  spending,  which  will  be  discussed 
shortly.  The  optimal  solution  of  the  consumer’s 
problem  will  be  characterized  in  the  next  section. 
As  in  the  c,ase  of  consumers,  there  are  a  large 
number  of identical  firms  in the  economy;  each  firm 
accesses.  a  constant  returns  to  scale  technologjr 
represented  by  the  production  function  F(kt,nt). 
During  each  period,  the  firm chooses  inputs  in order 
to  maximize  the  current  profit  (or  output)  at  the 
market-determined  wage  rate  and rental  rate.  Let  yt 
denote  output’  at  time  t;  then  the  firm  solves  the 
following  problem: 
The  role  of the  govern&&t  in  this  ,hypothetical 
economy  is a simple  one.  It collects  taxes  and  con- 
sumes  portions  of real  output  each  period.  It  is as- 
sumed  that  government  spending  is  not  utility-  or 
production-enhancing;  the  resources  claimed  by the 
government  are  simply  “thrown  into  the  ocean” 
and  vanish.  This’  assumption  may  not  be  the  most 
interesting  way to model  tlie function  of the  govern- 
ment,  but  it  serves  as  a useful  point  of  departure. 
Thus,  let  gt, be  the  percentage  of  output  that  the 
government  claims  each  period.  .Then  government 
purchases  at  time  t  are  gtyt.  In  order  to  finance  its 
purchases,  the  government  collects  taxes  Tt(wtnt  + 
rtkt),  which  are  equal  to  7tyt in. view  of the  constant 
returns  to  scale  technology.  As  noted  before,  the 
variable  Tt is the  income  tax  rate.  The  budget  con- 
straint  of the  government  at time  t, expressed  in per 
capita  terms,  is: 
gtyt  +  vt  =  7tyt.  (3) 
In short;  equation  (3) states  that  the  sum  of govern- 
ment  purchases  g,y,  and  lump-sum  transfers  vt must 
equal  tax  revenues  7tyt.  I rule  out  the  possibility  of 
debt  financing  and  money  creation  as  alternative 
means  to finance  government  purchases.  That  is, the 
4 The  gross  investment  it  is  the  sum  of  the  net  investment 
(kt $I-  kt), and  the  replacement  investment  6kt. 
6 Throughout  the  paper,  the  notation  F,,(.) wiIl be used  to denote 
the  partial  derivative  of  the  function  F  with  respect  to  the 
argument  nt,  which  is  the  marginal  product  of  labor.  Similar 
quantities  are  defined  accordingly. 
5 Later  on,  the  shock  I choose  turns  out  to  generate  negative 
gross  investment  at  the  time  of  impact,  but  not  later. 
’ It  should  be  mentioned,  however,  that  the  personal  income 
tax in the  hypothetical  economy  is equivalent  to a production  tax. 
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balanced  budget  constraint. 
The  variable  gt is an exogenous  policy  instrument 
that  is assumed  to  be  a random  variable:  Ideally,  the 
government  would  make  gt  contingent  on  certain 
variables  in  the  economy  such  as  output,  and  labor 
hours.  However,  a simplistic  view-will  be  taken  re- 
garding  the  policy  process  {gt):Specifically,  gt.is as- 
sumed  to  follow  a first-order  Markov  process  with 
a  given  transition  probability  that  is  known  to  all 
agents  in the  economy.  For  the  bulk  of the  analysis, 
the  transition  probability  will  be  further  structured 
so  that  it gives  rise  to  the  following  autoregressive 
representation: 
Eigt + 1  ktl  =  (1 -p)g’  +  P&t,  : 
0  SP  <  1.  (4) 
In this  representation,,  the  conditional  mean  of gt + 1 
depends  only  on  its  immediate  past  plus  a constant 
term  (1 -p)g*.  The  quantity  g’  is the  steady  state 
or long-run  level  of the  government  share  of GNP. 
The  autoregressive  parameter  p,  assumed  to be non- 
negative  and  less  than  one,  will determine  the  per- 
sistence  of government  spending.  The  larger  p  is, 
the  more  lasting  will  be  the  displacement  of  gt.  If 
p  =  0,  then  changes  ‘in government  spending  will 
be  completely  temporary. 
Although  the  government  is not  allowed  to  print 
money  or issue  debts  to finance  its purchases,‘it  still 
has  some  latitude  in choosing  different  tax schemes. 
Two  idealized  tax  systems  will be  considered  in this 
paper:  (1)  rt  =  0 .and (2)  rt  =  gt.  In  the  first  case, 
the  government  finances  all its purchases  by a lump- 
sum tax. That  is, the transfer  vt is negative  and equals 
gtyt in absolute  value.  In the  second  case,  all govern- 
ment  purchases  are  financed  by  an  income  tax  and 
the  lump-sum  transfer  will be zero  (i.e.,  vt  =  0). This 
policy  exerts  the  greatest  distortion  on the  behavior 
of  consumers. 
It  is  not  difficult  to  conceive  that  the  effects  of 
government  spending  will  depend  upon  the  way  it 
is financed.  For  instance,  if the  spending  is financed 
by  an  income  tax,  there  will be  substitution  effects 
that  will distort  market  outcomes.  Even’in  the  case 
of  a lump-sum  tax,  market  prices  will  still  have  to 
adjust  in response  to  changes  in quantities  that  are 
induced  by income  effects.  It is impossible  to assess 
the  impact  of government  spending  without  explicitly 
considering’  the  market  equilibrium. 
III. 
THE EQUILIBRIUM 
The  equilibrium  of the  model  economy  requires 
that  the  commodity  market  clear  at  each  date  and 
that  consumers  and  firms  solve  their  maximization 
problems  at the given  market  prices.  A formal  defini- 
tion  of the  equilibrium  is discussed  in the  appendix. 
Here  we focus  on characterizing  the  firm’s and  cqn- 
sumer’s  equilibrium. 
As noted  before,  the  firm’s problem  is straightfor- 
ward.  It requires,  as stated  in equation  (Z), that  the 
rental  rate  and  the  real wage  rate  equal  the  marginal 
product  of capital  and  labor,  respectively.  The  con- 
sumer’s  problem  requires  that  the following  two first- 
order  necessary  conditions  be satisfied in equilibrium: 
W(Ct,wJch~t)  =  (1  -  7th.  (5) 
UcWt)  =  P Et[uch + dt + 1) 
[1 +  (1 -7t+drt+l-611.  (6) 
Equation  (5)  states  that  the  rate  of  substitution  of 
consumption  for  leisure  (i.e.,  the  ratio  of  their 
marginal  utilities)  should  equal  the  opportunity  cost 
of leisure,  which  is the  after-tax  wage  rate.  Equation 
(6)  states  that  the  utility-denominated  price  of cur- 
rent  consumption  (i.e.,  marginal  utility  of  con- 
sumption)  should  equal  the  discounted  expected 
return  on  saving,  which  is  the  expected  value  of 
the  product  of  the  after-tax  return  to  investment 
[ 1  +  (1 -rt  + i)rt + i-61  and  the  next  periods 
marginal  utility of consumption  discounted  at the  rate 
fl.8 This  condition  implies  that  in  equilibrium  the 
consumer  is  indifferent  between  consuming  one 
extra  unit  of output  today  and investing  it in the form 
of capital  and  consuming  tomorrow.  Equations  (5) 
and  (6) together  with  the ,budget  constraint  (1)  and 
the  time  .constraint  It  +  nt  =  1  completely 
characterize  the. consumer’s  equilibrium. 
Figure  1  ‘presents  a two-quadrant’diagram  to illus- 
trate  the determination  of the consumer’s  equilibrium. 
For  this  purpose,  we  assume  that  there  is no uncer- 
tainty  in the  economy  and  that  the  utility  function 
is homothetic9  The  right-hand  quadrant  depicts  the 
‘. 
a Note  ‘that  in  a  deterministic  context,  the  gross  return  to 
investment  will be equal  to’one  plus  the  real interest  rate,  which 
is  the  ratio-of  marginal  utilities  of consumption  between  time 
t  and  time  t+l. 
9 A utility function  is called  homothetic  if the  marginal  rate  of 
substitution  depends  only  on  the  consumption-leisure  ratio.  A 
homothetic  utility  function  has  the  property  that  the  slope  of 
the  indifference  curve  is  constant  along  a  given  ray  from  the 
origin. 
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CONSUMER’S  EQUILIBRIUM 
Taking  the  real  interest  rate.  the  after-tax  wage  rate, 
and  the  after-tax  rental  rate  as  given 
’  5 
1  Slope  =  A 
-[(l-~t+,)rt+,+  l-4 
Intertemporal  Intratemporal 
Equilibrium  Equilibrium 
trade-off  between  consumption  (measured  along  the 
vertical  axis)  and  leisure  (measured  along  the  hori- 
zontal  axis) for a given  wage  rate  and tax rate  at time 
t. The  budget  line in the  right-hand  quadrant  for the 
consumer  at  time  t  has  two  .components:  the  ver- 
tical  segment  corresponds  to  the  nonwage  income 
which  is  fixed  at  the  beginning  of  the  period  and 
equals  [ 1 + (1 -  7t)rt - 61  kt  +  vt; the  sloping  segment 
corresponds  to labor  income  (1 -  Tt)wtnt and has the 
slope  -(l.-7t)wt.  From  equation  .(5),  the.slope  df 
-the indifference  curve  must  equal  the  after-tax  wage 
rate  in  equilibrium.  Since  the  utility  function  is 
homothetic,  this condition  determines  an equilibrium 
consumption-leisure  ratio  that  is represented  by the 
ray  OA  extended  from  the  origin.  . 
Equation  (5) alone cannot  pin down. the e&ilibrium 
point,  however.  To  Jocate  the  equilibrium,  ‘one must 
determine  saving  from  equation  (6).  Consider  the 
.point  E  along  the. ray  QA..There  is an indifference 
curve  tangent  at E-.with slope  equal  to  -(l-T  7t)wt. 
The  total  income  associated  with  this  point,  OB,  is 
divided  between  consumption-and  investment.  If in- 
vested,,  the  income  available  at  time  t + 1  is  OC, 
which  is  measured  from  right  to  left  along  the 
horizontal,axis  in quadrant  2. The  absolute, value  of 
the  Slope of the  bud&t  line  BC  is the  after-tax  rate 
of  return  to  capital.  [i.e.,  1  f  (1 -.+rt  +‘  l)rt + 1 -S]. 
According  to  equation  (6),  the  intertemporal  equi- 
librium  will be  achieved  at point  F,  where  the  indif- 
ference  curve  is tgngent  to the  budget  line BC.  The 
pdint  F  determines  the  optimal  saving  (i.e.,  kt+  1) 
BD  and time t consumption  OD  which coincide  with 
.those implied..by the-intratemporal-equilibrium  point 
E.10  Points  E  and  F  jointly  characterize  .the  con- 
sumer’s  equilibrium.  Other  quantities  such as leisure 
(labor hours)  and time t + 1 consumption  can be easily 
derived  once  the  equilibrium  point  is determined. 
I 
The.  appendix  sketches  a. numerical  procedure 
which’permits  computation  of the  equilibrium  and 
quantitative  assessment  of the  effects  of government 
spending.  This  approach  requires  one&to take  an ex- 
plicit  stand  on  -the  parameter  structure  of  the 
economy.  The’.rest  of  the  paper’  therefore  focuses 
-on a specific  example  and works  out  the  equilibrium 
implications.  of  changes  in  government  spending. 
IV. 
CALIBRATING THE MODEL 
The  example  considered  here  involves  a  loga- 
rithmic  utility  function: 
uict,  it)  F  @ In  ct  +  (T-0)  In  !t,  0  <’  0  <  1, 
and  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  function: 
.  . 
F&t,  nt)  =  kt”  nt 
1--, 
,  0  <  a,<  1. 
This  specification  is  widely  used’&  the  literature 
because  it  generates  dynamics  that  rodghly  match 
several  imp&&  features  of business  cycles’in  the 
U.S.  (see,  for  example,  King,  Plosser,  and  Rebel0 
(1988)).  Our  experiment  assumes  the  following 
values:  ai  =  0:3,  19  =’ 0.3,  p  =  0.96,  and  6  =  0.05. 
In  addition  to  pieferendes  and  technology,  one 
needs  explicitly  to ‘spell out .the  process  of .govern- 
merit’ spending.  As mentioned  before,  the  variable 
gt, i.e.,  the  ratio  qf government  spending  to real out- 
ptit,  is assumed  to  follow  a first-order  Mtirkov  pro- 
cess., In what  follows,’ the  autoregressive  parameter 
p is assigned  kither  a value  of 0 in the  case  of’s tem- 
porary  government  spending  oi a value  of 0.9  in the 
case of ‘a  more  persistent  goveriment  spending.‘Fur- 
ther,  the  random  variable  gt is assumed  to  possess 
a binomial distribution  with probabilities  concentrated 
on’five  distinct  points  o&r  a bounded  interva!.  The 
mean  and  variance..of  gt  are ,ta&en  to  be  9.3.. and 
0.005,  respectititiljr.  These  figures  imply  that  gt will 
fluctuate  around  30  ,percenF.  (i.e.,  g’  =  0.3), 
ranging  .approximately  from  15,  percent  to  45 
.  ._’ 
;O.if  the  intratemporal  equilibrium  and  the  intertemporal 
equilibrium  do  not  imply  the  same  consumption  and  saving 
decisions,  then  andther  point  along  the  ray OA  must  be chosen 
until  the  two  equilibria  are  consistent: 
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bility  of gt,  needed  to  numerically  solve  the  model, 
is constructed  using  the  method  proposed  by Rebel0 
and  Rouwenhorst  (1989). 
V. 
DYNAMIC  ‘EFFECTS  OF 
GOVERNMENT  SPENDING 
Consider  the  following  scenario:  Suppose,  initi: 
ally,  that  the  economy  has  settled  at its steady  state 
equilibrium,  and  that  government  spending  has 
reached  its  long-run  level  relative  to  the  economy’s 
real  output  such  that  30  percent  of  real  output  is 
claimed  by  the  government.  At  date  1 the  govern- 
ment  raises taxes  and increases  spending.  Thereafter, 
the  ratio  of  government  spending  to  real  output 
follows  a time  path  prescribed  by the  autoregressive 
process  and gradually  returns  to its steady  state.  The 
left-  and  right-hand  sides  of Figure  2 plot  the  mean 
path  of gt,  measured  as percentage  deviations  from 
the  steady  state,  for  p  =  0  and  p’  =  0.9,  respec- 
tively.  These  hypothetical  paths  are  generated  by 
taking  an average  of 5000  random  realizations  of gt, 
conditional  on  the  given  change  at  the  initial  date: 
Notice  that  the  case  of p  =  0.9  yields  a more  lasting 
displacement  of  gt. 
,. 
Given  the  displacement  of government  spending, 
what  would  be  the  dynamic  response  of quantities 
and prices  in the  pure  lump-sum  versus  pure  income 
tax  regime?  To  answer  this  question,  one  needs  to 
understand  the forces that govern  individual behavior. 
It  is instructive  to  consider  a simpler  case  in which 
the  increase  in government  spending  is financed  by. 
a lump-sum  tax.  Figure  3 shows  the  shift in the  con- 
sumer’s  equilibrium  for this  case.  As in Figure  1, the 
points  E and  F represent  the  initial equilibrium  prior 
to the occurrence  of shocks  to government  spending. 
As government  spending  rises,  the  budget  line shifts 
downward  by  an  amount  equal  to  the  increment  of 
government  spending,  i.e.,  -Avt  =  A&y,).  With 
lump-sum  tax financing,  the  slope  of the  budget  line. 
or the  after-tax  wage  rate  remains  unchanged.  As a 
result,  the  new  equilibrium  will still  lie on  the  rays 
OA  and  OB  (recall  that  the  utility  function  is 
homothetic).  Given  the  new  budget  constraint,  the 
intratemporal  and  intertemporal  equilibrium  will be 
achieved  at point  E ’ and F ‘, respectively.’  Since  there 
is only  an adverse  income  effect,  represented  by the 
downward  and  parallel  shift  of the  budget  line,  the 
new  equilibrium  displays  less  consumption  for both 
periods  and greater  work  effort. The  individual  is will- 
ing to work  harder  because  leisure  is a normal  good 
and  the  individual  is poorer  than  before  due  to  tax 
increases.  Because  both  income  and consumption  are 
lower,  the  effect  on saving  is indeterminate.  In other 
words,  at  the  initial  interest  rate,  saving  or  invest- 
ment  may  rise  or  fall,  so  it  appears  that,  the 
equilibrium  interest  rate  may  go  either  way.  In  the 
simulation  below,  however,  we will see  that  it rises. 
How  might  results  differ  with  income  tax  financ- 
ing? Now,  substitution  effects  of changes  in the  after- 
tax wage  rate  and  rental  rate  become  potentially  im- 
portant.  A change  in the  income  tax rate  will induce 
not  only  a  substitution  between  consumption  and 
leisure  at a given  date,  but  also a substitution  of con- 
sumption  over  time.  In  order  to  assess  the  impact 
of government  spending,  it is necessary  to trace  out 
the  equilibrium  paths  of  quantities  and  prices. 
The  dynamic  responses  of the  system  are displayed 
below  the  dotted  line  in  Figure  2.  These  response 
functions  are  calculated  by  taking  an  average  from 
5000  random  realizations  of the  system,  conditional 
on the  initial displacement  9f government  spending. 
To  contrast  the  effects  under  different  tax  regimes, 
each  figure contains  two  transition  paths  of the  same 
variable;  the  solid  line  traces  out  the  dynamic 
response  under  lump-sum  tax  financing;  the  dotted 
line  traces  out  the  dynamic  response  under  income 
tax  financing.  Since  the  steady  state  is different  for 
the  two  tax  regimes,  these  responses  are  expressed 
in  terms  of percentage  deviations  from  the  steady 
state.  The  following  discusses  the  different  implica- 
tions  under  the  two  tax  financing  schemes. 
Lump-Sum  Tax  vs.  Income  Tax  Financing 
(Temporary  Case) 
Consider  first  the  case  of a temporary  increase  in 
government  spending  in  which  gt jumps  from  30 
percent  to  above  40  percent  at  date  1.  Since  the 
shock  is temporary,  it lasts for about  one  period  (see 
Figure  2,  left-hand  side).  As  the  left-hand  side  of 
Figure  2  shows,  both  lump%um  tax  financing  and 
income  tax financing  have ‘negative effects  on capital, 
consumption,  and  investment.  The  magnitudes  are 
quite  different,  however.  In  the  case  of  lump-sum 
tax  financing,  capital  falls  by  3 percent  on  impact, 
while  consumption  and  investment  decrease  by  2 
percent  and  70 percent,  respectively.  The  negative 
effects  are  much  more  severe  under  income  tax  fi- 
nancing;  capital  falls  by  over  9  percent  while  con- 
sumption  and  investment  drop  by  more  than  5 per- 
cent  and  180 percent,  respectively.  Two  reasons  are 
responsible  ‘for  these  results.  First,  a  rise  in  the 
income  tax  rate  decreases  the  after-tax  marginal 
product  of capital.  In  addition,  a  decrease  in  labor 
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 Figure  3 
CONSUMER’S  EQUILIBRIUM: 
EFFECTS  OF  AN  INCREASE 
IN  LUMP-SUM  TAX 
The  lower  wage  rate  implies  that  leisure 
is  less  expensive  relative  to  consumption 
and  as a result,  consumers  are  more  willing 
to  take  leisure  instead  of  consumotion. 
-  Av, 
=  N%Y,) 
Finally,  there  is  an  interest  rate  effect. 
According  to  Figure  2,  the  real  interest 
rate  rises  on  impact,  which  largely  reflects 
the  increase  of aggregate  demand  associated 
with  an  increase  in  government  spending. 
The  rise in the  interest  rate  encourages  con- 
sumers  to work  harder  due  to  a higher  rate 
of  return.  Under  lump-sum  tax  financing, 
the  wage  effect  is dominated  by the  income 
effect  and  the  interest  rate  effect,  resulting 
in greater  labor effort.  Since  the capital stock 
is fixed  at the  beginning  of the  period,  out- 
put  also increases.  Although  the  interest  rate 
rises  even  higher  in the  case  of income  tax 
financing,  this rise together  with the  income 
effect  is  not  sufficient  to  outweigh  the 
hours,  which  results  also from  a lower  after-tax  wage 
rate,  pushes  the  marginal  product  of  capital  even 
lower.”  As  the  productivity  of  capital  falls,  agents 
have  less incentive  to accumulate  capital  so that  the 
decrease  in  investment  is larger  under  income  tax 
financing.  Finally,  the  lower  productivity  of capital 
and  labor  represents  an  additional  loss  of  income 
which  makes  agents  poorer  than  in the lump-sum  tax 
case.  Therefore,  the  decrease  in consumption  is also 
larger  under  income  tax financing.  In order  to induce 
agents  to consume  less,  the  real interest  rate  will go 
up  to  maintain  equilibrium  in  the  goods  market. 
The  most  visible difference  between  lump-sum  tax 
financing  and income  tax financing  shows up in their 
effects  on  labor  effort  and  real  output.  In  the  case 
of lump-sum  tax financing,  both  labor  effort  and real 
output  rise  on  impact  by  about  2 percent,  while  in- 
come tax  financing  causes  them  to decrease  by more 
than  24 percent  and  17 percent,  respectively.  Three 
forces  determine  the  response  of labor  supply.  First, 
an increase  in government  spending  leads to the  use 
of  real  resources  and  makes  agents  poorer.  This 
adverse  income  effect  motivates  consumers  to work 
harder.  However,  since  the  disturbances  are  tem- 
porary,  this  effect  is relatively  small.  Second,  there 
is a wage effect. As Figure  2 shows, the after-tax wage 
rate  falls by more  than  13 percent  in the  income  tax 
case,  as opposed  to  a tiny  0.6  percent  drop  in the 
lump-sum  tax  case.  The  larger  decrease  in the  wage 
rate  tends  to  dampen  the  response  of labor  supply. 
I1 Since  capital  and  labor  are  complements  in  production,  a 
decrease  in  labor  input  lowers  the  productivity  of  capital. 
wage  effect  so that  both  labor  hours  and  real  output 
decrease. 
The  initial  response  of the  interest  rate  and  out- 
put  can  be  analyzed  using  the  traditional  aggregate 
demand  and  aggregate  supply  paradigm.  Figure  4a 
depicts  the  equilibrium  shift  in  the  goods  market 
when  a lump-sum  tax is used  to finance  government 
spending.  The  real  interest  rate  and  output  are 
measured  on the  vertical  and horizontal  axis, respec- 
tively.  The  point  E  is the  initial  equilibrium  point. 
As government  spending  rises, the aggregate  demand 
schedule  shifts  to  the  right  because  of the  increase 
in goods  demanded  by the  government.  The  aggre- 
gate  supply  schedule  also shifts to the  right  because, 
as explained  above,  labor supply  increases.  However, 
since  the  increase  in government  spending  is tem- 
porary,  the  shift  in  aggregate  supply  will  be  rela- 
tively  small  due  to  the  negligible  income  effect.  As 
a  result,  there  is  an  excess  demand  at  the  initial 
interest  rate  r l , which  must  rise  in order  to  restore 
equilibrium  in the goods  market.  As the  real interest 
rate  rises,  aggregate  supply  (labor  effort)  increases 
while  aggregate  demand  (consumption  and  invest- 
ment)  decreases  and the  new equilibrium  is reached 
at point  F.  Comparing  points  E  and  F  reveals  that 
both  output.and  the  real  interest  rate  are  higher. 
: 
The  case  of income  tax financing  can be  analyzed 
in  a similar  fashion  (see  Figure  4b).  The  principal 
difference  here  is that  the  aggregate  supply  schedule 
will now  shift. to  the  left  because  of the  decrease  in 
labor  supply.  The  ,shift  in  aggregate  supply  will of 
course  depend,on  the  extent  to which  the  marginal 
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Figure  4a 
With  Lump-Sum  Tax 
\  Y:  (Aggregate  Supply) 
Figure  4b 
With  Income  Tax 
Y:  (Aggregate  Supply) 
‘I-  I’ 
I-I  (Aggregate 
1  I  Demand) 
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product  of labor  is reduced.  It turns  out  that  in the 
case under  consideration  the  shift of aggregate  supply 
outweighs  that  of aggregate  demand  .so that  output 
decreases  while  the  interest  rate  rises. 
The  analysis  up. to  this  point  has  focused  on  the 
short-run  effects of an increase  in government  spend- 
ing.  Consider  now  the  transition  dynamics  of  the 
system  after the  initial. impact.  Since  the capital  stock 
is lower  at  date.  1,  the  .marginal  product  of  capital 
increases.‘2  As a result,  agents  begin  to  accumulate 
more  capital  after  date  1.  As  the  .capital  stock  or 
investment  increases,  the  real  interest  ‘rate  (or  the 
marginal  product  of capital)  falls and  consumption 
begins  to rise.  Consumption  rises over  the  transition 
period  because  current  consumption  becomes  less 
expensive  relative  to  future  consumption  as  the 
interest  rate  declines  over  time.13  This  response 
applies  to the  lump-sum  tax  financing  as well as the 
income  tax financing.  Figure  2 shows,  however,  that 
the  transition  path  of real output  and labor  effort  will 
depend  on the tax regimes.  In the lump-sum  tax case, 
both. labor  hours  and real  output  decrease  over  time 
because  the  real interest  rate  falls (recall  that  a lower 
interest  rate  implies  a lower  labor  effort).  In the  case 
of income  tax,  the rising wage rate,  due to a decrease 
in the  income  tax  rate  and  an increase  in the  capital 
stock,  becomes  an overriding  force  that  pushes  labor 
hours  up  over  the .transition  period.  As can  be  seen 
from  the  figure,  labor  supply  will temporarily  over- 
shoot  the  steady  state  and  then  decline  to the  initial 
equilibrium.  As  labor  supply  and  the  capital-stock 
rise,  output  also  increases  until  the  steady  state  is 
reached. 
Lump-Sum  Tax  vs.  Income  Tax  Financhg 
(Persistent  Case) 
Suppose  n&v  that  the  increase  in  government 
spending  is more  persistent  (i.e.,  p  =  0.9j.  The  right 
panel  shows  that  the  responses  are  very  similar  to 
those  of a temporary  increase  in government  spend- 
&The  principal  difference  is the  implied  wealth 
effect.  Because  the  shock  is expected  to  persist  for 
a longer  period  of time,  the  wealth  effect  will now 
play  a more-important  role  in the  response  of quan- 
tities  and  prices. 
Consider  the  case  of  lump-sum  tax  financing. 
Figure  2 shows  that  labor  hours  rise  by  13 percent 
and  consumption  falls  by  10  percent  on  impact. 
These  responses  are  more  than  five  times  the 
responses  in  the  ‘temporary  case.  These  results 
occur  because  consumers  are poorer  than  in the  case 
of a temporary  shock.  To  induce  agents  to consume 
less  and  work  harder,  the  real  interest  rate  will also 
r; Since  labor  hours  rise under  lump-sum  tax financing,  iipushes 
the  marginal  product  of capital  even  higher.  Under  income  tax 
financing,  labor effort  decreases,  but  the  decrease  outweighs  that 
of  capital  (see  Figure.  2,  left-hand  side)  and  the  capital-labor 
ratio  is lower  at  date  1, implying  a higher  marginal  product  of 
capital. 
I3 The  negative  correlation  between  current  consumption  and 
the  real  interest  rate  is  sometimes  called  the  effect  of  inter- 
temporal  substitution. 
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is  predetermined,  real  output  rises  with  labor 
supply.  Perhaps  the  most  interesting  difference  here 
is that  investment  does  not  go  down  as much  as in 
the  temporary  case.  The  principal  reason  for  this 
result  is that  the  increase  in labor  hours  occurs  over 
a  more  extended  time  period  and  pushes  up  the 
marginal  product  of  capital  both  now  and  in  the 
future,  thus  raising  the  rate  of return  to investment. 
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  investment  will 
still go down  on impact  as consumers  try  to smooth 
out  consumption  by  holding  less  capital. 
The  adverse  income  effect  works  in  a  similar 
fashion  under  the  income  tax  regime.  In particular, 
consumption  drops  by  more  than  10  percent,  as 
opposed  to  a 5 percent  decrease  in  the  temporary 
case.  Because  of the  income  effect,  the  decrease  in 
labor hours,  which  is caused  by a lower after-tax wage 
rate,  is  smaller  than  that  in  the  temporary  case. 
Consequently,  the  decrease  of  real  output  is  also 
smaller.  Because  the  decrease  of  labor  effort  is 
smaller,  the  marginal  product  of capital  does  not  go 
down  as much  as in the  temporary  case,  leading  to 
a  smaller  decrease  in  investment. 
Although  the  initial effects  of a persistent  increase 
in  the  income  tax  rate  are  not  as  large  as  those  in 
the  temporary  case  (except  consumption),  major 
variables  such  as  output  and  investment  will  stay 
below  their  steady  state  for  a long  period  of time. 
In fact,  the  shock  is so persistent  that  agents  will eat 
up  some  existing  capital  for  one  period  before  con- 
sumption  (and  capital)  begins  to  rise  over  the  tran- 
sition  period.  This  is the  case  of .a severe  recession. 
The  reason  for this  result  is that  the  marginal  prod- 
uct  of capital  is so low in the  future  that  agents  have 
very  little  incentive  to  accumulate  capital. 
A  surprising  feature  of  the  income  tax  regime  is 
that  the  real  interest  rate  declines  in  response  to  a 
persistent  increase  in government  spending.  Again, 
this  result  can be  attributed  to the  income  effect.  As 
noted  before,  output  supply  will  decline,  but  the 
decrease  will not be as much  as that  in the temporary 
case  because  the  income  effect  motivates  agents 
to  work  harder.  On  the  demand  side,  the  income 
effect  and  the  lower  productivity  of  capital  in  the 
future  decrease  both  consumption  and  investment 
at the  initial  real  interest  rate.  The  decrease  of con- 
sumption  and  investment  may  reach  the  point  at 
which  it outweighs  the  increase  of government  pur- 
chases,  leading  to  a decrease  of aggregate  demand. 
The  extent  to which  aggregate  demand  decreases  will 
depend  on how  long  the  shock  persists.  It turns  out 
that  in  the  case  under  consideration,  .the  decrease 
in  aggregate  demand  is quite  sizable  so  that  at  the 
initial  real  interest  rate  there  is  an  excess  supply, 
resulting  in a lower  interest  rate.  Clearly,  this  argu- 
ment  hinges  on the  persistence  of the  shock  and  the 
intensity  of  the  income  effect.  If  the  government 
spending  shock  is less  persistent,  then  the  interest 
rate will decline  by a smaller  amount  or even  increase 
as  in  the  pure  temporary  case. 
VI. 
CONCLUSIONSANDEXTENSIONS 
This  paper  examines  the  balanced  budget  effects 
of government  spending  under  different  tax  financ- 
ing  schemes.  The  results  suggest  that,  in  the  case 
of  lump-sum  tax  financing,  persistent  changes,  in 
government  spending  have  larger  effects  on  prices 
and  quantities  except  investment.  This  result,  due 
to  larger  income  effect  and  interest  rate  effect,  is 
consistent  with  the  findings  of  King  (1989)  and 
others.  In general,  an increase  in government  spend- 
ing  under  lump-sum  tax  financing  will  reduce  con- 
sumption  and  investment  but  raise ‘labor effort  and 
real output.  This  result  is driven  by the  income  and 
interest  rate effects that encourage  individuals  to,work 
harder.  Under  income  tax financing,  however,  some 
of  the  above  results  are  reversed.  In  particular, 
regardless  of the persistence  of spending  shocks,  both 
output  and  labor  effort  now  decline  in  response  to 
an  increase  in  government  spending.  This  result 
occurs  because  the decline  in the wage rate dominates 
the  income  and  interest  rate  effects. 
There  are  several  features  of the  model  that  are 
oversimplified  and  can  be  improved  upon.  Most 
notably,  the  government  budget  is  assumed  to  be 
balanced  in each  period.  This  assumption  prevents 
one  from  seriously  considering  the  implications  of 
deficit  or  debt  financing.  It  is  relatively  easy  to 
introduce  such  a financing  scheme  into  the  model. 
Extension  along  this  line  will probably  yield  fruitful 
results  if government  debts  coexist  with  some  types 
of distortionary  tax such  as the  income  tax considered 
in  this  paper.  The  most  important  implication  of 
debt  financing  is that  it allows  the  tax  burden  to  be 
smoothed  out  over  time.  This  mechanism  reduces 
the  distortionary  effect  on  labor  supply,  particu- 
larly  when  the  increase  in government  spending  is 
temporary.  In this  case,  real output  and  labor  hours 
may  no  longer  decline  as in  the  case  of a balanced 
budget. 
Another  extension  worth  undertaking  concerns  the 
function  of government  spending.  The  current  paper 
assumes  that  government  spending  is  a  waste  of 
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This  assumption  is inappropriate  for  some  types  of  tion  or production  function,  such  as those  employed 
government  spending  that  may  either  substitute  for  by  Barro  (1984).  Such  refinements  would  nullify  or 
private  consumption  or increase  the  economy’s  pro-  even  reverse  some  of the  negative  effects  associated 
ductivity.  These  features  could  be  introduced  into  with  income  tax  financing. 
APPENDIX 
This  appendix  presents  a  definition  of  the 
equilibrium  discussed  in  the  text  and  outlines  a 
numerical  method  to construct  the  equilibrium.  For- 
mally, the  general  equilibrium  for the  model  economy 
consists  of  a  sequence  of  quantities  {ct,kt + l,nt,lt} 
and  prices  {wt,rt)  that  satisfy  the  following  two  con- 
ditions:  (1)  the  sequence  {ct,kt + l,nt,lt)  solves  the 
maximization  problems  of consumers  and  firms  for 
a given  sequence  of prices  {wt,rt)  and  (2)  the  com- 
modity  market  clears  at  each  date  t  such  that  ag- 
gregate  demand  equals  aggregate  supply: 
The  approach  used  to  determine  the  equilibrium 
of the  model  economy  is as follows.  First,  substitute 
the  time  constraint  and  equations  (1) -  (3) and  (Al) 
into  (AZ)  and  (A3)  to  obtain 
ul[(l  -gt)F(kt,nt)+(l-Qkt-kt+l,l  -al 
u,Kl  -gt)F(kt,d  +(I  -W  -kt+  1~1  -4 
and 
= (1 -  dF&,nt),  (A4) 
ct  +  it  +  gtyt  =  yt.  (Al) 
Equation  (Al)  states  that  the  total  of consumption, 
investment,  and government  purchases  must  exhaust 
total  output.  The  government  budget  constraint, 
which  must  also  be  satisfied  in  equilibrium,  is  im- 
plied  by the  market-clearing  condition  (Al)  and  the 
individual  budget  constraint  (1)  in  the  text. 
To  further  characterize  the  equilibrium  one  must 
solve  the  maximization  problems  of consumers  and 
firms.  The  firm’s  problem  is straightforward.  It  re- 
quires,  as stated  in equation  (Z), that  the  rental  rate 
and  the  wage  rate  be  equal  to  the  marginal  product 
of  capital  and  labor,  respectively.  This  condition 
defines  the  equilibrium  prices  that  will clear  the  labor 
market  and  the  rental  market  for the  existing  capital 
stock.  As  discussed  in  the  text,  the  consumer’s 
equilibrium  is characterized  by the  budget  constraint 
(1) and  the  time  constraint  It +  nt  =  1 together  with 
two  first-order  necessary  conditions,  which  are  re- 
written  as  follows: 
u&l  -gdF(kt,nt)+(1-6)kt-kt+1,1-ntl  = 
P  Et  {udl  -gt  + dF(kt  + m  + 1) 
+  (1-6)kt+l-kt+2,1-nt+ll 
x  [(1-7t+l)Fk(kt+l,nt+l)  +  (1-N).  645) 
Note  that  equations  (A4)  and  (A5)  are  alternative 
versions  of  the  consumer’s  equilibrium  with  quan- 
tities  and  prices  replaced  by  the  market-clearing 
condition  and  the  firm’s marginal  conditions.  These 
two equations  jointly  determine  the  equilibrium  level 
of capital  kt + 1 and  labor  nt,14 which  can  be  used  to 
determine  consumption,  investment,  output  and 
equilibrium  prices.  Note  that  given  the  beginning  of 
period  capital kt, a decision  rule for kt + 1  is equivalent 
for  a  saving  decision  made  at  time  t. 
u1hlt)~u,(ct,1t)  =  (1  -  7t)Wt.  (AZ) 
uchld  =  P  Et[uch  +  l,lt  +  I) 
11 +  (1-7t+drt+~-4].  (A3) 
The  meaning  of  (AZ)  and  (A3)  is  discussed.in  the 
text. 
In general,  an analytical  solution  to equations  (A4) 
and  (A5) does  not  exist  except  for a very  few special 
cases.  Numerical  methods  are  therefore  required  to 
obtain  an approximate  solution.  The  following briefly 
describes  an  iterative  procedure  used  to  solve  the 
model.  Technical  details  of this method  can be found 
in Coleman  (1989)  and  will not  be  presented  here. 
Basically,  the  solution  to  equations  (A4)  and  (A5) 
comprises  a pair of decision  rules  for capital  kt + 1 and 
labor  nt that  can  be  expressed  as functions  of kt and 
I4 Note  that  kt + 2 and  nt + I are “integrated  out”  when  (A4)  and 
(A5)  are  solved. 
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cedure  involves  approximation  of these  decision  rules 
over  a finite  number  of discrete  points  on  the  space 
of  kt  and  gt.  Starting  from  an  arbitrary  capital  rule 
(usually,  a zero  function),  the  procedure  first  solves 
the  labor  rule  from  equation  (A4)  and  then  iterates 
on  equation  (AS)  until  the  capital  rule  converges  to 
a stationary  point,  that  is, until  capital  as a function 
of kt and  gt does  not  change  over  consecutive  itera- 
tions.  The  resulting  stationary  function  is  the 
equilibrium  solution  for  capital  and  labor. 
By construction,  the  above procedure  yields  solu- 
tions  that  satisfy  both  (A4)  and  (AS)  for  all contin- 
gencies  of  government  spending.  These  solutions 
imply  three  imputed  or shadow  prices  that  are  con- 
sistent  with  the  market  equilibrium.  Specifically,  the 
equilibrium  wage  rate  wt  and  rental  rate  rt  can  be 
computed  from the  firm’s marginal  condition  (Z), and 
the  real  interest  rate  r4, by  definition,  is the  ratio  of 
the  marginal  utilities  of consumption’between  time 
t and  time  t + 1, i.e.,  u,(ct,lt)/[PEtuC(ct  + r,lt + I)].  In 
a deterministic  equilibrium,  the gross  real interest  rate 
r:  is equal  to  (1 -  6) plus  the  capital  rental  rate  rt + I, 
as can  be  seen  from  equations  (A3)  and  (AS).  This 
is the  price  that  will  clear  the  commodity  market. 
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